Impact of Income on Price and Income Responses in the Differential Demand System by Brown, Mark G.
 
RESEARCH PAPER:  2006-6 
 
 
IMPACT OF INCOME ON PRICE AND 





Mark G. Brown 
Senior Research Economist 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CITRUS 
Economic and Market Research Department 
P.O. Box 110249 
Gainesville, Florida 32611-2049 USA 
Phone:  352-392-1874 
Fax:  352-392-8634 
Email:  mgbrown@ufl.edu 
 
www.floridajuice.com  
*Mark G. Brown is Research Economist with the Economic and Market Research Department, 
Florida Department of Citrus, University of Florida, 2129 McCarty Hall, P.O. Box 110249, 
Gainesville, Florida 32611-0249, Telephone (352) 392-1874, Fax (352) 392-8634, E-Mail: 







Impact of Income on Price and Income Responses  














Impact of Income on Price and Income Responses 





  An extension of the differential demand system model is developed that allows the 
demand system’s income and price responses to vary with income level.  The model’s income 
flexibility and marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) out of income are made functions of 
real income measured by the Divisia volume index.  The income flexibility is a factor of 
proportionality underlying all price effects and a change in this term impacts the sensitivity of all 
demands to prices.  Price effects are also made a function of the MPCs using a uniform substitute 
specification.  The model was used to analyze the conditional demands for a group of beverages.  
The findings indicate that changes in conditional total beverage expenditures result in various 
income and price elasticity changes across individual beverage products. 
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Impact of Income on Price and Income Responses 




  The differential demand system is based on the fundamental matrix equation of consumer 
demand derived through differentiation of the first-order conditions of the utility maximization 
problem (Theil 1975; Barten, 1966). The basic differential demand system is known as the 
Rotterdam model and there are two parameterizations of this model— the absolute price version 
and relative price version.
1  The relative price version of the Rotterdam model has been useful to 
impose various separability and preference-structure restrictions. To allow for increased 
flexibility in the income and price responses, as well as for specification of non-price, non-
income explanatory variables, various extensions of the differential model have been suggested 
including those that combine the features of the Rotterdam model and Almost Ideal Demand 
System (Barten, 1993) and those based on the Basmann, Tintner and Ichimura condition for the 
impacts of non-price, non-income variables (e.g., Theil, 1980b; Duffy; and Brown and Lee, 
1997, 2002). 
  In this study a further extension of the relative price version of the Rotterdam model is 
proposed to analyze the impact of income level on the price and income responses in the 
differential demand system.  In an empirical analysis, the demands for a group of beverage 
products are considered and the model specified is a conditional demand system.  The focus is  
on how total expenditures on the product group (conditional income) impacts the price and 
income coefficients  of the conditional demand equations for the group.   
  The relationship between income and the effects of prices on demands was earlier 
examined by Timmer in context to food policy.  Timmer argued that as real income increases,  
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the own-price elasticity of food tends to decline.  Timmer, as well as Theil, Chung and Seale, 
noted that own-price elasticities based on the linear expenditure system or quadratic expenditure 
system (Pollak and Wales) actually supported the opposite conclusion that price elasticities 
increase with income level.  This conclusion is apparently related to the restrictive nature of 
these demand models and exemplifies the importance of a flexible demand specification.  Theil, 
Chung and Seale developed and estimated a more flexible cross-country demand model and 
found that the own-price elasticity for food did tend to decrease as real income increased.  More 
recent analysis by Bouis supports this finding.  Given the conditional income variable for the 
beverage group considered in the present study differs from the broader definition of income 
used by Timmer and the other studies mentioned, there is no reason, however, to believe the 
previous findings that increases in income reduce the price responses should apply to the present 
study.   
Model 
  Consider the utility maximization problem confronting consumers—how to allocate 
income over available goods.  The solution is the affordable bundle of goods that yields the 
greatest utility.  Formally, this problem can be written as maximization of u = u(q) subject to p’q 
= x, where u is utility; p’= (p1 , . . . , pn) and q’ = (q1 , . . . , q n) are price and quantity vectors with 
pi  and qi being the price and quantity of good i, respectively; and x is total expenditures or 
income.  The first order conditions for this problem are Mu/Mq = λp and p’q = x, where λ is the 
Lagrange multiplier which is equal to Mu/Mx.  The solution to the first order conditions is the set 
of demand equations q = q(p, x), and the Lagrange multiplier equation λ = λ(p, x).  The 
Rotterdam demand model is an approximation of this set of demand equations and the model 
developed in this paper is an extension of this approximation.  Analyses by Barnett, Byron and  
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Mountain show that the Rotterdam approximation is comparable to other flexible functional 
forms such as the Almost Ideal Demand System. 
Rotterdam Model 
  Following Theil (1975, 1976, 1980a,b), the Rotterdam model can be written as 
(1) wi d(log qi ) = θi d(log Q) + 3 jπij d(log pj)    i=1 , . . , n, 
where wi = piqi/x is the budget share for good i ; θi = pi (Mqi/Mx) is the MPC for good i; d(log Q) = 
3wi d(log qi) is the Divisia volume index;
2 and πij = (pi pj / x) sij is the Slutsky coefficient, with sij 
= (Mqi /Mpj + qj Mqi/Mx) being the i,j
th element of the substitution matrix S.  The Rotterdam model 
can be obtained from the total differential of the first order conditions, as shown in Appendix A.  
  From equation (A7) in the Appendix, the Slutsky coefficient can be written as 
(2)  πij = φ (θij - θi  θj),  
where θij = ( (pi pj λ )/(x φ ) ) u
ij, with u
ij being the i,j




-1.  The parameter φ is a factor of proportionality, referred to as the 
income flexibility, and is equal to the reciprocal of the elasticity of the marginal utility of income 
with respect to income; φ is negative based on the assumption that U is negative definite for 
utility maximization (this result follows from the definition of Mλ /Mx in equation (A5), given  λ > 
0 and x>0). The term φ θij captures the specific substitution effect while the term -φ θi θj captures 
the general substitution effect (Theil, 1975).   
  The general restrictions on demand (1) are (e.g., Theil 1975, 1976, 1980a,b) 
(3a) adding  up:  3 i θi  = 1;  3 i πij = 0;  
(3b) homogeneity:  3 jπij = 0;  
(3c) symmetry:  πij = πji . 
  Based on restrictions (3), the restrictions on Slutsky coefficient specification (2) are  
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(4a) adding  up:  3 i θij = θj;  3 j3 i θij = 1; 
(4b) homogeneity:  3j θij = θi; 
(4c) symmetry:  θij = θji . 
 The  θijs are referred to as normalized price coefficients since by restriction (4a) they add 
up to one. 
Extension 
  Consider making the income flexibility a function of income as suggested by Theil, and 
Theil, Chung and Seale.  Since the income flexibility is a factor of proportionality for all price 
effects, a change in this term results in a general change across all goods with respect to the 
sensitivity of demands to prices.  Adding subscript t for time, the income flexibility is specified 
as  
(5a)  φt = φt-1 + α d(log Qt), 
where α is a coefficient to be estimated. 
  For the first observation (t=1), the parameter φt is 
(5b)  φ1 = φ0 + α d(log Q1). 
  For the second observation, φ2 = φ1 + α d(log Q2), or substituting the right-hand side of  
result (5b) for φ1  
(5c)  φ2 = φ0 + α (d(log Q1) +  d(log Q2)). 
  Successively substituting in this manner, the income flexibility at time t can be written as 
(5d)  φt = φ0 + α dzt 
where dzt = 3h=1 to t d(log Qh). 
  The Divisia volume index indicates the period-to-period percentage change in real 
income (the weighted average percentage change in quantity demanded).  Thus the term dzt can  
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be viewed as a measure of the percentage difference between real income in period t and period 
0. 
  Substituting equation (5d) into equation (2) and then equation (2) into equation (1) yields 
the first extended demand specification considered here, i.e., 
(6a) wi d(log qi ) = θi d(log Q) + (φ0 + α dzt) 3 j (θij - θi  θj) d(log pj)   
or 
(6b) wi d(log qi ) = θi d(log Q) + (φ0 + α dzt)3 j θij [d(log pj) - 3 j θj d(log pj)],     
where the restriction 3j θij = θi has been used to eliminate θi in the price term.  The term 3 θj
 
d(log pj) is known as the Frisch price index (Theil, 1980a).  
  The other parameters of the model, the MPCs (θi) and normalized price coefficients (θij), 
might similarly be made functions of income.  An extended specification of the MPC is 
 (7a)  θi t = θi t-1 + βi d(log Qt), 
where βi is a slope coefficient specific to good i and the subscript t here is for time (not to be 
confused with the second subscript used in the normalized price coefficients). 
  Following the income-flexibility progression from (5a) through (5d), the MPC can be 
written as 
 (7b)  θit = θi0 + βi dzt, 
where 3i θi0  = 1 and  3i βi   = 0, based on restriction (3a). 
  A specification where the normalized price coefficients are functions of the varying 
MPCs (7b) is considered subsequently.  Thus, changes in the MPCs will result in both changes in 
the income and price effects along with the above effect of the income flexibility on the general 
sensitivity of demand to prices.   
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Relationships with the Almost Ideal Demand System   
  The basic relationship between the Rotterdam model and the Almost Ideal Demand 
System (AIDS) was noted by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) in their original paper on the 
AIDS.  Except for the dependent variable, the first difference form of the AIDS is approximately 
the same as the Rotterdam model—the two models have the same explanatory variables but the 
dependent variable for the differential AIDS is the change in the budget share (dwi) while that 
for the Rotterdam model is wid(logqi ).  This similarity has given rise to several extensions of the 
Rotterdam model.  These extensions combine the features of the basic Rotterdam and AIDS 
models making the MPC and Slutsky coefficients functions of the budget shares (Barten, 1993).  
  The AIDS can be considered a price extension of an Engel curve model proposed by 
Working and Leser.  This latter model can be written as   
(8)  wi = αi  + βi log(x). 
 
The AIDS adds to equation (8) the price term 3j γij log pj and replaces the income term with 
log(x/p) where p is a price index, i.e., wi = αi +3j γij log pj+ βi log(x/p).  
  The income elasticities for the Working-Leser model and AIDS are
3   
(9) ei = 1 + βi /x. 
  Given the MPC is equal to the budget share times the income elasticity—
(piqi/x)(Mqi/Mx)/(x/qi) = piMqi/Mx—the MPCs corresponding to the Working-Leser or AIDS 
models are found by multiplying equation (9) by wi, i.e., 
(10)  θi = wi + βi. 
  Substitution of equation (10) into equation (1) results in the CBS model (Keller and van 
Driel; Barten, 1993).  This model has the income responses of the Working-Leser and AIDS 
models and the price responses of the Rotterdam model.  
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  Consider the differential of equation (10) with respect to the log of income, i.e., 
(11a) dθi = (Mwi/Mlog x) dlog(x) 
or, based on equation(8), 
(11b)   dθi = βi dlog(x). 
  When the AIDS specification of wi as a function of income and prices is used in the 
above derivations, we obtain 
(11c)   dθi = βi dlog(x/p), 
or 
(11d)   dθi = βi dlog(Q), 
where dlog(x/p) is approximated by the Rotterdam income variable dlog(Q) as suggested by 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a).  
  When the CBS-based equation (11d) is expressed in discrete differences with the lagged 
value of the MPC moved to the left-hand side of the equation, it is the same as the present 
paper’s MPC extension, equation (7a).  Thus, equation (7a) can be considered a reduced form 
specification of the MPC of the CBS model with respect to the income variable (the present 
MPC extension, however, is not a complete reduced form specification of the MPC of the CBS 
model, since the budget shares in the CBS specification of the MPC depend not only on income 
but prices and other variables).  This reduced form specification avoids an endogeneity problem 
inherent in differential demand models that use budget shares as explanatory variables.  When 
the CBS specification (10) is directly substituted into (1), the endogenous variable wi appears on 
the right-hand side of the resulting equation.  In the CBS model, this problem is handled by 
moving the term wi dlog(Q) to the left-hand side of the model.  However, for some similar 
extensions, this problem can not be handled so simply.  For example, below we consider a model  
 
8
(uniform substitute model) which makes the normalized price coefficients a function of the 
MPCs.  If the CBS specifications of the MPCs are used in this model, the endogeneity problem 
can not be removed by rearranging the equations.  Brown and Lee (2000) handled this particular 
problem by using the lagged budget share in the MPC specification.  Equation (7a) is an 
alternative, direct specification that does not involve endogeneity per se.     
Restrictions on the Relative Price Version of the Rotterdam Model         
  The relative price verison of the Rotterdam model including the present extension (6b) 
can not be estimated unless some restriction is place on the θijs (Theil, 1971).  In the absolute 
price version, the MPC (θi) can be identified from the income variable or Divisia volume index, 
and the Slutsky coefficients (πij)can be identified from the price variables, provided the data used 
to estimate the model are rich enough.  Defining the matrices θ = [θi], π = [πij], and Θ = [ θij], 
equation (2) can be written as π = φ(Θ- θ θ’).   The problem is “can φ and Θ be determined given 
π and θ are known?”  The answer, in general, is no.  The solution for Θ, given π, θ and  φ is Θ = 
π/ φ +  θ θ’; when π and θ are known but  φ is unknown different values of φ can be used to 
generate different values of  Θ , but each set of estimates of φ and  Θ  would be consistent with 
the known π and θ.  However, when one constraint is put on Θ, in addition to those for 
homogeneity and symmetry, the parameter φ can be estimated (Theil, 1971).  In this study, the 
restrictions underlying the uniform substitute model are placed on Θ.  To examine alternative 
restrictions such as those resulting from separability, a reformation of the Rotterdam model is 
provided in Appendix B.  
Uniform Substitute Model 
  Consider the Rotterdam model specific substitution term θij specified in equation (2).  
This term equals the factor of proportionality, λ /(x φ), times pi pj u
 ij .  Given u




element of the inverse of the Hessian matrix, the term pi pj u
 ij is the i,j
th element of the matrix [M
2 
u /M(piqi )M(pjqj)]
-1.   Thus, the inverse of pi pj u
ij is M
2 u/M(piqi)M(pjqj), which indicates how the 
marginal utility of a dollar spent on good i changes in response to another dollar spent on good j.  
  Let G denote a group of goods—the different types of beverage products in this study. If 
the goods in this group were identical, the above marginal-utility changes for these goods would 
be the same, say k0; i.e., M
2u/M(piqi)M(pjqj) = k0 , for i,j 0 G.  Instead of being exactly identical 
goods, assume the goods are nearly identical with respect to key attributes but unique with 
respect to some.  The nearly identical nature of goods i and j is assumed to result in generic type 
changes in the marginal utilities, as indicated by k0 (the more one beverage is consumed and 
thirst is satiated, the lower the marginal utility of all beverages), while the unique nature of the 
goods are assumed to result in product specific changes (ki) in the marginal utilities. These two 
concepts can be expressed by M
2u/M(piqi )M(pjqj) = k 0 + Δ ij ki , where Δij is the Kronecker delta 
(Δij = 1 if i=j, otherwise Δij=0), and both k0 and ki are negative.  This specification of changes in 
marginal utilities underlies the uniform substitute model.      
  As shown in Appendix C, under the assumption that group G is block independent of 
other goods, the Slutsky coefficients for the uniform substitutes can be written as   
 
(12)  θij  = (1/(1- kθG )
 )θi (Δij - kθj ) ,        i, j 0 G, 
where k is a positive parameter reflecting the commonality of the uniform substitutes in effecting 
utility; and θG is the MPC for group G.  For further discussion of this derivation, see Theil 
(1980a); and Brown and Lee (1993).  
  Substituting (12) into (2), the Slutsky coefficients for uniform substitutes can be written 
as 
(13)  πij = φ1 θi (Δij -φ2θj ),                  i, j 0 G,  
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where φ1 = φ/(1-k θG ) and φ2 = φ (1+ k /(1-k θG )/φ1. 
Conditional Rotterdam Model 
  Restrictions on consumer demand models, useful for empirical analysis, can be motivated 
through two- or multi-stage budgeting processes.  In a two-stage budgeting process, a consumer 
first decides the amounts of income to allocate to broad groups of commodities (first stage), and 
then the amount allocated to each group is further allocated to individual goods in the group.  
The second-stage demand equations for individual goods in a group are called conditional 
demands, being functions of the amount of income allocated to the group and the prices of the 
goods in the group.  In the Rotterdam model, two stage budgeting is consistent with the 
imposition of separability restrictions on Slutsky coefficients (Theil, 1976).  The conditional 
Rotterdam demand equations have the same general structure as the unconditional demands 
specified above, equations (1) and (6), except the real income variable or the Divisia volume 
index is based on income allocated to the group, the prices are those for the goods in the group, 
and the coefficients are conditional, being functions of the unconditional coefficients (e.g., Theil 
,1976; Brown and Lee, 2000).   
Conditional Uniform Substitute Model 
  To obtain a conditional demand system for goods in group G (beverage products), an 
expression for the aggregate demand for group G is first obtained by summing the unconditional 
demand equations (1) over the goods in G, i.e., 
 
(14)  d(log QG ) =  θG d(log Q) + 3 jπG j d(log pj),  
where d(log QG ) = 3 i 0 G wi d(log qi ); θG = 3 i 0 G θi ; and πG j  = 3 i 0 G πij . 
   Rearranging (14), we find d(log Q) = [d(log QG ) - 3 jπG j d(log pj) ] / θG; and substituting 
this result into (1) we find  
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(15) wi d(log qi ) = θi
* d(log QG)  +  3 j πij
* d(log pj) , 
where  θi
* = θi / θG ; and πij
* = πij - θi
* πG j .  
  At this point, the j subscript in equation (15) runs across all goods (j=1,…,n).  However, 
under appropriate conditions, this equation becomes a conditional demand system for group G, 
i.e., the j subscript only runs across goods in group G.  For block independence, the assumption 
underlying the uniform substitute specification, the Hessian matrix is group or block independent 
and M
2 u /Mqi Mqj = 0 for i and j belonging to different groups.  Thus, for i and j in different groups, 
the inverse element u
 ij  = 0 and hence θij = 0.  This result means that πi, j  = -φ θi θj ,  i0 G, jó G.  
As a result πij
* = 0,  i0 G, jó G; i.e., πij
* =  - φ θi
 θj - (θi / θG) [- φ  3 i 0 G θi
 θj ] =  - φ θi
 θj + (θi / θG 
) φθG
 θj = 0.  Hence, under block independence, equation (15) is the conditional demand for a 
good in group G. 
  For uniform substitute specification (13), the conditional Slutsky coefficient  is  
(16)  πij
* = φ1 θi (Δij -φ2θj ) - θi
*3 i 0 G φ1 θi (Δij -φ2θj ) 





*  = (φ θG)/(1-k θG ).  The parameter φ
* is negative given φ is negative and 0 < θG < 1. 
  Hence, for uniform substitutes, conditional demand equation (15) can be written as 
(17) wid(log qi) = θi




            = θi
*d(log QG) + φ
*θi
*(d(log pi) - 3 j 0 G θj
*d(log pj)). 
The term 3 i 0 Gθj
*d(log pj) is known as the Frisch price index for group G (Theil, 1975, 1980a).  
   By dividing (17) by wG = 3i0G wi, we obtain an alternative conditional demand 
specification,  
(18) wi




*(d(log pi) - 3 j 0 G θj




* = wi/wG ; d(log QG
*) = 3 i 0 G wi
*d(log qi), a conditional Divisia volume index; and φ
** 
= φ
*/wG  = (φ θG)/(1-k θG )/wG. 
  In equation (18), we make the factor of proportionality φ
** and the conditional MPCs 
functions of the conditional income variable, d(log QG
*); i.e., following equations (5d) and (7b),   
φt
**  = φ0
**  + α
** dzt
*, where dzt
* = 3h=1 to t d(log Qh
*); and  θi t




*.  Note that the 
term k embedded in φt
** provides an additional motivation for the varying income-flexibility 
specification. Namely, dφ
**  = (φ











t-1 + α d(log Q
*
t).  That is, the underlying substitution between uniform 
products indicated by k may depend on the level of income spent on the group.   
Application 
  Conditional demands for beverages were studied using ACNielsen data based on retail 
scanner sales for grocery stores, drug stores, mass merchandisers along with an estimate of Wal-
Mart sales based on a consumer panel.
5   Twelve beverages were included in the model: 1) 100% 
orange juice (OJ), 2) 100% grapefruit juice (GJ), 3) 100% apple juice (AJ), 4) 100% grape juice 
(GRJ), 5) remaining 100% juice (RJ), 6) vegetable juice (VJ), 7) less-than -100% juice drinks 
(JD), 8) carbonated water (CW), 9) water (W),10) diet soda (DS), 11) regular soda (RS), and 12) 
tea (T).  Data for dairy and non-liquid beverage products were not provided. 
  The data are weekly running from week ending July 27, 2002 through week ending 
August 13, 2005 (160 weekly observations).  The raw data were comprised of gallon and dollar 
sales.  In our application, quantity demanded was measured by per capita gallon sales which was 
obtained by dividing raw gallon sales by the U.S. population; prices were obtained by dividing 
dollar sales by gallon sales.  Sample mean per capita gallon sales, prices and budget shares are 
shown in Table 1.  The infinitely small changes in quantities and prices in the differential models  
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were measured by discrete first differences (Theil, 1975, 1976).  To account for seasonality, first 
differences of sine and cosine variables were included—sine(2πt/52) and cosine(2πt/52) where π 
= 3.14..., observation t = 1, ..., 160 and 52 is the number of weeks in a year .  Average budget 
share values underlying the differencing were used in constructing the model variables---w
*
i,t 





  The demand specifications studied are conditional on expenditure or income allocated to 
the 12 beverage categories.  Income allocated to the beverage group is measured by the 
conditional Divisia volume index which was treated as independent of the error term added to 
each beverage demand equation for estimation, based on the theory of rational random behavior 
(Theil, 1980a; Brown, Behr and Lee).  As the data add up by construction---the left-hand-side 
variables in model (18) sum over i to the conditional Divisia volume index---the error covariance 
matrix was singular and an arbitrary equation was excluded  (the model estimates are invariant to 
the equation deleted as shown by Barten, 1969).  The parameters of the excluded equation can be 
obtained from the adding-up conditions or by re-estimating the model omitting a different 
equation.  The equation error terms were assumed to be contemporaneously correlated and the 
full information maximum likelihood procedure (TSP) was used to estimate the system of 
equations.  
  The estimates of uniform substitute model (18) with varying income flexibility and MPCs 
are shown in Table 2.  The individual equation r-squares ranged from .47 (grapefruit juice and 
water) to .96 (regular soda).  These measures, however, are not generally good indicators of 
goodness of fit, given the equation-system estimation method used (Bewley).  An alternative 
measure is the system r-square (Buse; Bewley) which was .994.  Both the constant and slope 
coefficient estimates for the income flexibility and 18 out of the 24 (constant and slope)  
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coefficients estimates for the MPCs  were statistically significant at the α = .10 or smaller level.  
Of the 24 seasonality coefficients, 13 were statistically significant.     
  The constant and slope coefficients for the income flexibility are both negative, implying 
that the conditional beverage demands are more sensitive to price as income increases.  The 
MPC constants are all positive while the MPC slopes are negative, expect for juice drinks, water 
and tea, indicating that, except for these latter three beverages, the conditional MPCs decrease as 
income increases; for juice drinks, water and tea, the opposite occurs, as income increases, their 
MPCs increase.  Based on the MPC constant and slope estimates, the estimated value of the 
MPC for each beverage across the sample was in the zero-one interval.  The income flexibility is 
also negative over the sample observations which, along with the MPC estimates, indicate that 
the estimated demand system satisfies the negativity condition of demand. 
 Conditional  income  (ei) and price elasticity estimates (eij), calculated at sample mean 






it  and eij  = (φ0















jt ei ).  Corresponding standard error estimates are shown 
in Appendix D. Regular and diet soda have the highest income elasticity at 1.28 and 1.16, 
respectively; the income elasticities for the remaining beverages range from .64 for orange juice 
to .97 for apple juice.  The own-price elasticities ranged from -1.37 and -1.47 for orange juice 
and carbonated water, respectively, to -2.25, -2.09 and -2.07 for diet soda, apple juice and regular 
soda, respectively.  All the cross-price elasticity estimates are positive, reflecting substitution, 
although some are relatively small.   
  The impacts of income on the demand elasticities are illustrated in Table 4.  The income 
and own-price elasticities, calculated at the minimum, mean and maximum values of the income 
variable dzt
*, are shown.  The largest changes in the income elasticities are for water, apple juice,  
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vegetable juice and grape juice, while the smallest changes are for diet soda, regular soda, orange 
juice and grapefruit juice.  For water and diet soda, the income elasticities at the maximum 
income level are 154% greater and 10% less than the corresponding values at the minimum 
income level, respectively.  All income elasticities decrease with income except those for juice 
drinks, water and tea which increase, following the directional changes mentioned above with 
respect to the individual beverage MPC changes. 
  The largest changes in the own-prices elasticities are for water, tea and apple juice, while 
the smallest changes are for grapefruit juice, remaining juice and orange juice.  The water and tea 
own-price elasticities at the maximum income level are 169% and 133% greater in absolute 
value, respectively, than the corresponding elasticities at the minimum income level.  The 
grapefruit juice own-price elasticity at the maximum income level is only 1% larger than its 
value at the minimum income level.  The own-price elasticities for orange juice, grapefruit juice, 
juice drinks, water, diet soda, regular soda and tea increase with income, while those for apple 
juice, grape juice, remaining fruit juice, vegetable juice and carbonated water decrease with 
income.  The various impacts of income on the demand elasticities may be of interest to analysts, 
marketers and planners in the beverage industry, monitoring and trying to understand the 
underlying causes for volume changes in the market. 
  Given the conditional income variable for the beverage group differs from the broader 
definition of income used by Timmer and the other studies mentioned earlier, as well as the array 
of beverages considered, it may not be surprising that the present conditional demand findings 
for some of the beverages differ from the previous unconditional findings that increases in 
income reduce the price responses.  Conditional demands only partially describe consumer 
behavior; determination of conditional income is required for a complete description.  Changes  
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in conditional income for the beverage group may be related to a number of variables, including 
beverage prices, prices of goods outside the beverage category and total consumer expenditures 
across all goods, as well as various preference variables such as consumer demographics and 
advertising.  The impact of the conditional income variable on the price and income coefficients 
may thus indirectly reflect the impacts of such other factors through their impacts on conditional 
income.  Regardless the underlying cause for changes in conditional income, it may still be 
useful to know how this variable impacts the beverage price and income responses.  Data 
available to analyze and monitor sales may be limited to that for a product group, as in this study, 
and knowledge of whether the impacts of prices and total group expenditures on the product 
demands are weaker or stronger as total group expenditures change may be important to product 
category decision makers. 
Conclusions 
  This paper extends the Rotterdam model to analyze the impact of income level on the 
price and income responses of demand.  Previous extensions proposed by Barten (1993), 
including the synthetic model which combines features of the Rotterdam and AIDS, have made 
the Rotterdam model income and price coefficients functions of the budget shares of the goods.  
The budget shares, however, are endogenous, and their use as explanatory variables, in general 
results in an endogeneity problem, although for certain specifications (CBS) the problem can be 
handled by rearrangement of model terms.  The present extension here is related to those 
suggested by Barten (1993) but avoids the latter endogeneity problems in that the income and 
price coefficients are specified as functions of changes in income level, reflecting the changes in 
the budgets shares due to this factor.  Additional model flexibility is provided by also specifying 
the income flexibility underlying the price coefficients as a function of the change in income.  To  
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estimate the income flexibility, however, requires some restriction(s) on the normalized price 
coefficients of the Rotterdam model.  In the present study, uniform-substitute-model restrictions 
are imposed.     
  The empirical analysis focuses on the conditional demands for beverages.  The results 
indicate that income level does impact the MPCs, income flexibility and Slutsky coefficients.  
The range of conditional income and price elasticities, based on the income level extremes of the 
sample, is relatively large.  Such findings may be of interest for understanding changes over time 
in demands for products.  The increased flexibility of the varying-coefficient specification of the 
uniform substitute model may also be of interest for analyzing other product groups dominated 
by substitution, and when the uniform substitute model is not applicable, the varying MPC and 
income flexibility specifications can still be applied provided appropriate restrictions on the 






1 The absolute price verion can also be derived from the difference version of the double 
log model by imposing the basic properties of demand— adding up, homogeneity of zero in 
prices and income, and symmetry (e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b).  
 
2 The Divisia volume index is a close approximation of d(log x)-3wi d(log qi) in (A6) in 
Appendix A, as shown by Theil, 1971;  d(log Q) is used instead of d(log x)-3wi d(log qi) to 
insure adding-up. 
 
3 Given  wi = piqi /x, log (wi) = log(pi) + log(qi) - log(x), and the Mlog(wi)/Mlog (x) =   
Mlog(qi )/Mlog (x) - 1.  Based on equation (8), Mlog(wi)/Mlog (x)=  βi /wi; and hence ei = 
Mlog(qi)/Mlog (x) = 1+ βi / wi. 
 
4 Additional stages in allocating income can be added resulting in a multi-stage budgeting 
process. 
 
5 Data are for U.S. grocery stores doing $2 million and greater annual sales, Wal-Mart 
stores excluding Sam’s Clubs, mass-merchandisers, and drug stores doing $1 million and greater 




  To obtain the Rotterdam model, totally differentiate the first order conditions of the 
utility maximization problem to find 
(A1)  Udq = p dλ + λ dp  
(A2)  p’dq = dx -q’dp, 
where  U = [ M
2u/MqiMqj] , the Hessian matrix.  This differential is known as the fundamental 
matrix equation of consumer demand theory (Barten, 1977; Phlips). 
   Next, multiply (A1) by U
-1 to obtain  
(A3)  dq = U
-1 p dλ  + λ U
-1 dp. 
Result (A3) can be viewed as a partial demand system with the second term on the right-hand  
side (λU
-1) being a matrix whose elements are known as specific price effects that show the  
effects of prices, given income compensations to hold both real income and the marginal utility 
of income (λ) constant (e.g., Theil, 1975, 1976). The uniform substitute model is based on the 
structure λU
-1 . 
  To obtain a total demand relationship, solve for dλ by multiplying (A3) by p’, 
substituting the right-hand side of (A2) for p’ dq, and rearranging terms to find 
(A4) dλ= [(dx -q’dp )  - λ p’ U
-1 dp]/p’ U
-1 p . 
  Substituting (A4) into (A3), we obtain the total effects of prices and income on demand--
-Mq/Mp’, Mq/Mx.  We express these results below as Hicksian or income-compensated demand 
equations, i.e.,    
(A5)  dq = U
-1 p [ [(dx -q’dp ) - λ p’ U
-1 dp ]/p’ U
-1 p  ]+ λ U
-1 dp , 
       = Mq/Mx (dx -q’dp) + S dp ,  
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where  Mq/Mx= U 
-1 p / p’ U
-1 p, Mλ/Mx= 1 / p’ U
-1 p,  and S = λU
-1  - (Mq/Mx) (Mq/Mx)’ (λ/Mλ/Mx).  
The term S is the price substitution matrix---S = Mq/Mp’ + (Mq/Mx) q’.  The term (dx -q’dp ) is real 
income.  
  Finally, multiply both sides of equation (A5) by  ^ p  (symbol ^ over a vector indicates a 
diagonal matrix; off diagonal elements equal zero; diagonal elements equal the vector in 
question) and 1/x,  pre-multiply dq by the identity matrix in the form of ^ q ^ q
-1, post-multiply  q’ 
and S by ^ p  ^ p
-1 to obtain the Rotterdam model: 
(A6)   ^ p ^ q/x ^ q
-1 dq  =  ^ p Mq/Mx (dx/x  -q’^ p/x  ^ p
-1 dp ) +( ^ p S ^ p/x ) ( ^ p
 -1 dp). 
 The  term  ^ p S ^ p/x is known as Slutsky matrix, denoted by 
 π.  Given the definition of S in 
(A5), the Slutsky matrix can be written as
   
(A7)  π = φ [(λ/φ x) ^ p U
-1 ^ p
 ] - ^ p (Mq/Mx)(Mq/Mx)’^ p, 
where φ= (Mlog λ /M log x)
-1 .  
   In equation (1), Model (A6) is expressed more conveniently in terms of log changes, 




  Consider the price term without the income flexibility in equation (6b), i.e., 3 j θij [d(log 
pj) - 3 j θj d(log pj)].  Breaking out on the own-price component, this term can be written as   
 
(B1)  θii [d(log pi) - 3 j θj d(log pj)] + 3 j…i θij [d(log pj) - 3 j θj d(log pj)].       
  Based on restriction (4b),  θii  =  θi - 3j …i θij.  Substituting the right-hand side of this result 
for the first parameter θii of equation (B1) yields 
(B2) [θi - 3j …i θij][d(log pi) - 3 j θj d(log pj)] + 3 j…i (θij [d(log pj) - 3 j θj d(log pj)], 
or, simplifying, 
(B3)  θi[d(log pi) - 3 j θj d(log pj)] + 3 j…i θij [d(log pj)  - d(log pi)].           
  Substituting result (B3) for 3 j θij [d(log pj) - 3 j θj d(log pj)] in equation (6b) yields 
(B4) wi d(log qi ) = θi d(log Q) + (φ0 + α dzt) θi[d(log pi) - 3 j θj d(log pj)] 
              + (φ0 + α dzt) 3 j…i θij [d(log pj)  - d(log pi)].      
  Equation (B4) is in a convenient form to impose separability restrictions on the cross-price 
parameters θij.  For example, if good i is strongly separable from the other goods θij = 0 for j…i 
(Theil, 1971, 1976).  Likewise, if goods i and j belong to different weakly separable groups, say 




  Consider the partition of goods into groups 1, ..., G , ... , M .   Under block independence, 
the utility function can be written as u = f1
 (Q1) + ... + f J (QG ) + ... fM (QM ), where  fG is a 
subgroup utility function  for group G; and QG is a vector of quantities for goods in group G.  In 
this case, the Hessian matrix U can be written 
(C1) U=  diag(U1 , ... , UG , ... ,UM), 
where diag is the  bock diagonal operator---diagonal matrices are UN , N=1, ... , M; off diagonal 
elements are zero.  The matrix UN  =  [u
 
ij ] = [M 
2 u /Mqi M qj]
  =  [M 
2 fN /Mqi M qj]
 , i, j 0 N. 
  From (2) and (A7), the specific substitution matrix of the Rotterdam model is the factor of 
proportionality φ times the matrix [θij ] = (λ/φ x) ^ p U
-1 ^ p
 , which under (C1), can be written as 
(C2) [θij ] =  (λ/φ x) [^ p [diag(U1 
-1
 , ... , UJ
-1, ... UM
-1 ) ] ^ p ], 
where p = ( P1 , ... PG , ... , PM ), with PN being the price vector for goods in group N.   
  Let the goods in group G be uniform substitutes.  From (C2), note that the specific 
substitution terms are zero for goods from different groups.  For goods from the same group, the 
specific substitution terms are φ times 
(C3) [θij ] = (λ/φ x) [ ^ pG UG
-1
 ^ pG]. 
  The inverse of (C3) is  
(C4) [θ
ij ] = (φ x/λ) ^ pG
-1 UG ^ pG
-1 
or, focusing on individual matrix elements 
(C5)  θ
ij = (φ x/λ) [M 
2 u / M (pi qi ) M (pj qj ) ] ,  i, j 0 G, 
where the superscripts indicate inverse elements.  Result (C5) shows the effect of another dollar 
spent on good j on the marginal utility of a dollar spent on good i, multiplied times a factor of 
proportionality (φ x/λ).  
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  Theil’s uniform substitute model assumes that all cross effects in (C5) are the same given 
similarity of goods, while own effects are unique.  Formally, this assumption can be written as 
(C6) [θ
ij ] = a ^
-1   + k ι ι ‘,       i,j 0 G,  
where a is a vector of positive elements, k is a positive number and, ι is unit vector (column) and ‘ 
is the transpose operator.  Since φ is negative, (C6) indicates that marginal utilities decrease with 
increased consumption. The i
th element of the vector a equals ki  (φ x/λ), and  k = k0  (φ x/λ). 
  The inverse of (C6) is 
(C7a) [θij ] = a ^ - (k/(1+k ι ‘a ^ ι )) a ^ ι ι ‘a ^,  
or     
(C7b)  [θij ] = a ^ - (k/(1+k ι ‘a )) a a‘        i,j 0 G. 
  Given restrictions (4) and the assumption of blockwise independence, 3  j 0G θ ij = θ i for 
i0G; and 3  i0G  θ ij = θ j for j 0G,.  Hence, post multiplying (C7) by ι  (summing columns ) yields 
(C8a)  θ = a (1- (k ι ‘ a / (1+k ι ‘a )) , 
or 
(C8b)    a = θ (1+k ι ‘a ), 
where θ = [θi ] , i 0 G.   
  Also, pre multiplying (C8b) by ι’ yields 
(C9a)   ι ‘a = θG (1+k ι ‘a ), 
or, after solving (C9a) for ι ‘a, multiplying the result through by k, and adding one, we find  
(C9b)   1 + k ι ‘a = 1/(1 - k θG ), 
where θG = ι‘θ  is the marginal propensity for group G. 
  Hence, result (C8b) can be written as 
(C10)    a = θ / (1 - k θG ),  
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  Substituting (C10) into (C7) gives 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics of Beverage Sample, 07/27/02 Through 08/13/05 
Gallons/Week  Price: $/Gallon  Budget Share  Beverage 
Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev
Orange
a  0.052 0.004  4.35  0.06  10.2% 1.2% 
Grapefruit
a  0.002 0.000  5.04  0.44  0.5% 0.1% 
Apple
a  0.017 0.002  3.50  0.10  2.6% 0.5% 
Grape
a  0.005 0.001  5.58  0.10  1.3% 0.2% 
Remaining Fruit Juice
a  0.014 0.001  5.61  0.22  3.5% 0.3% 
Vegetable
b  0.007 0.001  6.27  0.28  1.9% 0.2% 
Juice Drinks
b  0.108 0.015  3.55  0.11  16.9% 1.0% 
Carbonated Water  0.016  0.002  2.59  0.05  1.8%  0.1% 
Water 0.157  0.030  1.58  0.04  10.9%  1.6% 
Diet Soda  0.145  0.013  2.51  0.11  16.2%  1.0% 
Regular Soda  0.289  0.032  2.48  0.11  31.8%  1.8% 
Tea 0.016  0.004  3.60  0.11  2.5%  0.4% 
 Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum     
Sum of Divisia Volume Index
c  -0.0242 0.0677  -0.1732  0.2028     
 
a 100% juice. 
b Less than 100% juice. 





Table 2.  Full Information Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Uniform Substitute Model with Varying Income Flexibility and 
MPCs 
MPC Constant  MPC Slope  Sine  Cosine 
Beverage 
Estimate  Standard 
Error  Estimate  Standard 
Error  Estimate  Standard 
Error  Estimate  Standard 
Error 
Orange
a  0.0650 0.0044 -0.0199  0.0527 0.0109  0.0018  -0.0026 0.0018 
Grapefruit
a  0.0037 0.0002 -0.0016  0.0025 0.0002  0.0001  -0.0003 0.0001 
Apple
a  0.0230 0.0012 -0.0943  0.0151 0.0053  0.0008 0.0005 0.0008 
Grape
a  0.0107 0.0007 -0.0232  0.0098 0.0014  0.0005  -0.0015 0.0005 
Remaining Fruit Juice
a  0.0290 0.0013 -0.0145  0.0154 0.0025  0.0008  -0.0015 0.0008 
Vegetable
b  0.0156 0.0009 -0.0389  0.0130 0.0015  0.0007  -0.0004 0.0007 
Juice Drinks
b  0.1254 0.0062 0.1122  0.0712  -0.0111  0.0042 0.0017 0.0041 
Carbonated Water  0.0119  0.0006  -0.0072  0.0082  -0.0012  0.0003  -0.0004  0.0003 
Water 0.1064  0.0074  0.2548  0.0788  -0.0168  0.0043  0.0041  0.0043 
Diet Soda  0.1868  0.0036  -0.0513  0.0382  0.0044  0.0032  -0.0035  0.0032 
Regular Soda  0.4043  0.0069  -0.1492  0.0722  0.0075  0.0062  0.0021  0.0062 
Tea 0.0182  0.0015  0.0331  0.0161  -0.0047  0.0013  0.0017  0.0013 
Constant Slope   
Estimate  Standard 
Error  Estimate  Standard 
Error 
    
Income Flexibility  -2.20764  0.048156  -0.996687  0.547078         
 
a 100% juice. 









Orange  Grape- 




Vegetable  Juice 
Drinks 
Carb. 
Water  Water  Diet 
Soda 
Regular 
Soda  Tea 
Orange
b  0.641 -1.373 0.002 0.019  0.008  0.018  0.011  0.063  0.005 0.070  0.159 0.052 0.004 
Grapefruit
b  0.780 0.032  -1.700  0.023  0.009  0.022 0.014 0.077  0.007  0.085  0.194  0.447  0.010 
Apple
b  0.971 0.040  0.003  -2.092  0.012  0.028 0.017 0.096  0.008  0.106  0.242  0.556  0.013 
Grape
b  0.894 0.036  0.003  0.026  -1.940  0.026 0.016 0.089  0.008  0.098  0.222  0.512  0.012 
Rem. Fruit Juice
b  0.828 0.034  0.003  0.024  0.010  -1.784 0.015 0.082  0.007  0.091  0.206  0.474  0.011 
Vegetable
c  0.888 0.036  0.003  0.026  0.011  0.025  -1.924 0.088  0.008  0.097  0.221  0.509  0.012 
Juice Drinks
c  0.727 0.030  0.002  0.021  0.009  0.021 0.013 -1.515  0.006  0.080  0.181  0.416  0.010 
Carb. Water  0.675  0.028  0.002  0.020  0.008  0.019  0.012  0.067  -1.469  0.074  0.168  0.387  0.009 
Water 0.918  0.037  0.003  0.027  0.011  0.026  0.016  0.091  0.008  -1.903  0.228  0.526  0.012 
Diet Soda  1.161  0.047  0.004  0.034  0.014  0.033  0.020  0.115  0.010  0.127  -2.247  0.666  0.015 
Regular Soda  1.284  0.052  0.004  0.038  0.015  0.037  0.023  0.127  0.011  0.141  0.319  -2.068  0.017 
Tea 0.701  0.029  0.002  0.020  0.008  0.020  0.012  0.069  0.006  0.077  0.174  0.402  -1.521 
 
a Price elasticities are uncompensated and conditional. 
b 100% juice. 




Table 4.  Conditional Income and Uncompensated Own-Price Elasticity Estimates At Selected 
Divisia Volume Indexes 









d  0.670 0.641  0.597  -1.338  -1.373 -1.411 
Grapefruit
d  0.828 0.780  0.707  -1.682  -1.700 -1.701 
Apple
d  1.510 0.971  0.150  -2.992  -2.092 -0.363 
Grape
d  1.166 0.894  0.478  -2.353  -1.940 -1.151 
Rem. Fruit Juice
d  0.889 0.828  0.735  -1.783  -1.784 -1.751 
Vegetable
5  1.199 0.888  0.415  -2.408  -1.924 -1.000 
Juice Drinks
5  0.628 0.727  0.878  -1.248  -1.515 -1.950 
Carb. Water  0.735  0.675  0.584  -1.489  -1.469  -1.403 
Water 0.570  0.918  1.447  -1.150  -1.903  -3.094 
Diet Soda  1.209  1.161  1.089  -2.174  -2.247  -2.339 
Regular Soda  1.354  1.284  1.178  -2.001  -2.068  -2.151 
Tea 0.502  0.701  1.004  -1.021  -1.521  -2.384 
 
a Calculated at the minimum value of the Divisia volume index sum variable. 
b Calculated at the mean value of the Divisia volume index sum variable. 
c Calculated at the maximum value of the Divisia volume index sum variable. 
d 100% juice. 








Orange  Grape- 




Vegetable  Juice 
Drinks 
Carb. 
Water  Water  Diet 
Soda 
Regular 
Soda  Tea 
Orange
b  0.0366 0.0769 0.0003 0.0017  0.0010 0.0020  0.0013 0.0100  0.0009 0.0109 0.0100  0.0109 0.0005 
Grapefruit
b  0.0387 0.0068 0.0818 0.0020  0.0012 0.0024  0.0016 0.0118  0.0011 0.0138 0.0109  0.0234 0.0028 
Apple
b  0.0408 0.0082 0.0004 0.0800  0.0015 0.0026  0.0018 0.0140  0.0013 0.0163 0.0117  0.0268 0.0035 
Grape
b  0.0538 0.0079 0.0004 0.0025  0.1138 0.0028  0.0019 0.0137  0.0013 0.0158 0.0146  0.0325 0.0032 
Rem. Fruit Juice
b  0.0325 0.0072 0.0004 0.0020  0.0013 0.0668  0.0016 0.0120  0.0011 0.0140 0.0101  0.0222 0.0030 
Vegetable
c  0.0451 0.0077 0.0004 0.0023  0.0014 0.0025  0.0924 0.0129  0.0012 0.0155 0.0125  0.0277 0.0032 
Juice Drinks
c  0.0351 0.0064 0.0003 0.0018  0.0011 0.0020  0.0014 0.0742  0.0010 0.0132 0.0096  0.0232 0.0027 
Carb. Water  0.0338  0.0059  0.0003  0.0018  0.0011  0.0019  0.0013  0.0104  0.0733  0.0121  0.0095  0.0212  0.0025 
Water 0.0649  0.0079  0.0004  0.0027  0.0016  0.0029  0.0020  0.0156  0.0014  0.1358  0.0178  0.0395  0.0034 
Diet Soda  0.0208  0.0098  0.0005  0.0026  0.0017  0.0029  0.0021  0.0162  0.0015  0.0192  0.0430  0.0278  0.0042 
Regular Soda  0.0213  0.0109  0.0005  0.0028  0.0019  0.0032  0.0023  0.0183  0.0017  0.0210  0.0138  0.0345  0.0046 
Tea 0.0649  0.0064  0.0003  0.0024  0.0013  0.0025  0.0016  0.0121  0.0011  0.0137  0.0177  0.0384  0.1411 
 
a Price elasticities are uncompensated and conditional. 
b 100% juice. 
c Less than 100% juice. 
 